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Abstract. This paper considers a sequence of discrete-time random walk
markets with a safe and a single risky investment opportunity, and gives con-
ditions for the existence of arbitrages or free lunches with vanishing risk,
of the form of waiting to buy and selling the next period, with no shorting,
and furthermore for weak convergence of the random walk to a Gaussian
continuous-time stochastic process. The conditions are given in terms of the
kernel representation with respect to ordinary Brownian motion and the dis-
cretisation chosen. Arbitrage and free lunch with vanishing risk examples
are established where the continuous-time analogue is arbitrage-free under
small transaction costs—including for the semimartingale modifications of
fractional Brownian motion suggested in the seminal Rogers [Math. Finance
7 (1997) 95–105] article proving arbitrage in fBm models.
1 Introduction
If a continuous-time model for a financial market is discretised in time, will then
the discretised version inherit its properties when it comes to free lunches, or ab-
sence of such? Asking the converse question: if a continuous-time model is the
weak limit—“weak” because this topology gives neighbouring profits/loss process
distributions for a given strategy—of a sequence of discrete-time models, will free
lunch properties or no free lunch properties carry over the limit transition?
There is actually no guarantee that this will be the case. In Shiryaev’s book
(1999, Section VI.3), there are given stronger sufficient conditions for convergence
to fair prices in terms of weak convergence of the (driving noise, pricing kernel)
pair. This paper will show that if this joint convergence fails, then there is a wide
range of problems where the arbitrage properties differ between the discretised
prices and their weak limits, even when small transaction costs are introduced to
the former.
This author’s initial interest in the problem at hand, emerges from a work by
Sottinen (2001), who establishes a sequence of discrete-time binary symmetric
random walk (semimartingale) markets, which (a) converges weakly to a Black–
Scholes market with prices being geometric fractional Brownian motion with
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Hurst parameter H > 1/2, and (b) admits an arbitrage obtained by waiting for
the right moment to buy (if nonnegative drift) or short sell (if nonpositive drift) the
stock, and unwinding the position the very next period; the “right moment” is of
course when you might with probability one know that the stock market beats the
money market even if tomorrow is a bad day (in which case you buy), or waiting
for the conversely adverse stock market (in which case you short-sell). Now frac-
tional Brownian motion is not a semimartingale, and as is well known since Rogers
(1997) (for the positively autocorrelated parameter range), it will introduce arbi-
trages to canonical models where the ordinary Brownian motion does not. In view
of this, there seems to have been a view that the result of Sottinen (2001) is due
to specifics of the fBm, or at least its nonsemimartingale property, and this au-
thor admits to having fallen prey to this interpretation, which—as we shall see—is
inaccurate.
This paper sets out to show that the phenomenon discovered by Sottinen (2001),
is to be expected way more generally, including in the discretisation of arbitrage-
free semimartingale price processes. As an example, we refer to Rogers (1997),
who also proposes a parametrised semimartingale process whose moving average
kernel converges to the fBm’s—preserving the long memory which was the reason
for suggesting fBm as a driving noise in the first place, but eliminating the short
memory which caused the arbitrage. It turns out that when attempting to discretise
in a manner akin to the construction of Sottinen (2001), the long memory will
introduce arbitrages, and the arbitrage property is robust enough to withstand even
the introduction of a small transaction cost. It is then essential that the discretised
version has bounded downside (cf. the results of Guasoni (2006), Guasoni et al.
(2008)). A different example, admitting free lunch with vanishing risk (FLVR) in
the discretisation, is the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process.
We shall on one hand give sufficient conditions for the existence of arbitrage or
FLVR of the form (i) wait for a possible time to buy, and then (ii) sell next period.
On the other, we give sufficient conditions for weak convergence of the discrete
random walks to the Gaussian continuous-time counterparts. Because the results
concerning arbitrages will require bounded innovations in the random walks, the
weak convergence result (Theorem 2.2) will also be restricted to this case. Our
main contributions compared to the previous literature (primarily Sottinen (2001)),
are summarised as follows:
• We cover a fairly general class of Gaussian processes, and give examples to the
existence of arbitrages/FLVRs of the above-mentioned form.
• Furthermore, we point out that the arbitrage for discretised fBm can emerge
from the (originally desirable) long-run memory of the process, even if the
short-run memory (which causes the arbitrage in the continuous-time model)
is modified as to obtain the semimartingale property, for example, as suggested
by Rogers (1997).
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• We cover any negative drift term (a word which should be interpreted cautiously
for nonsemimartingales) without shorting, as it turns out that the instantaneous
growth from the noise term can tend to infinity.
• For the same reason the arbitrage may also admit sufficiently small transaction
costs.
• We do not have to assume the discretised market to be binary (hence complete if
arbitrage-free) with symmetric innovations. We will however assume bounded
support, where the bound might depend on how fine the discretisation.
• Weak convergence of the driving noise is likewise shown in this more general
setting.
2 The continuous-time and discrete-time market models
Our market has one “safe” asset, taken as numéraire and normalised to price = 1,
and one “risky” asset S(n), which for each n is a discretisation of a continuously
evolving stochastic process S. S will be constructed from a drift process A with
time-derivative a(t) and a driving noise Z, assumed to be a Gaussian moving aver-
age process with right-continuous sample paths and an adapted (hence upper limit
of integration is t) kernel representation
Z(t) =
∫ t0
−∞
K(t, s)dW(s)+
∫ t
t0
K(t, s)dW(s)
(2.1)
= J (t) +
∫ t
t0
K(t, s)dW(s),
with respect to standard Brownian motion W , where K is a given function satisfy-
ing the following properties:
K is deterministic and piecewise-continuous, (2.2a)
K(t, s) = 0 if s ≥ t (2.2b)
and ∫ t
−∞
(
K(t, s)
)2 ds < ∞ ∀t. (2.2c)
We assume that the agent enters the market at a given time t0 ≥ 0.
Notice that (2.2c) follows from the assumed Gaussian distribution, as the ex-
pression is in fact E[(Z(t))2]. Notice also that some representations involve K with
a definition split in order to achieve square integrability, compensating the distant
past. A frequently occurring representation form (cf., e.g., Cheridito (2004)) is
K(t, s) = κ(t − s)− κ(−s), and under the assumption that the kernel vanishes for
s ≥ t , then we have κ(−s) = 0 for s ≥ 0. We shall later give particular attention to
such a form of the type K(t, s) = κ((t − s)+) for t > s > t0, where we not need to
specify the definition below t0.
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We might choose to discretise W on the entire time line; however, J will merely
enter as a drift term, and we can equally well discretise J directly. We shall choose
to do the latter. Hence, we start by discretising the time scale (equidistantly) in
intervals of length 1/n, where for each n we define
s
(n)
i = t0 +
i − nt0
n
, (2.3)
where · is the floor function (rounding toward −∞). Then we discretise W for
t > t0 by replacing its normalised increments n1/2 · [W(s(n)i+1) − W(s(n)i )] by ran-
dom variables ξi+1 = ξ (n)i+1. Now discretise Z into
Z(n)(t) = J
(nt
n
)
+
nt−1∑
i=nt0
K
(nt
n
, s
(n)
i
)
· n−1/2ξ (n)i+1. (2.4)
For A we can take A(t0) = 0, as we are interested in increments only; we therefore
define A and its discretisation as
A(t) =
∫ t
t0
a(s)ds, A(n)(t) = 1
n
nt−1∑
i=nt0
a
(
s
(n)
i
) (2.5)
and finally, S and its discretisation are assumed, respectively defined, to satisfy
S = G(A + Z), S(n) = G(A(n) + Z(n)). (2.6)
The canonical choice is G to be the exponential function, but we shall not need
this specific property; for Proposition 3.2, we will however use convexity, and for
Theorem 2.2 we shall need continuity. Except when K vanishes, the S(n) and the ξi
sequence will generate the same filtration, so the first of the following assumptions
is not very restrictive:
Assumption/notation 2.1. We assume formulae (2.1) through (2.6) to hold, and
furthermore:
• The filtration will be generated by the {ξi}, so that the information at time t , is
generated by {ξi}i≤tn.
• By “step number j ,” we shall mean at time s(n)j . That means that the agent’s first
chance of trading, is not at step 0, but at prices noted at step j0 := nt0. Should
this lead to a singularity due to for example, t0 = 0, K(t,0) = +∞, then we
shall however eliminate this by assuming (without mention) that t0 is > 0 and
irrational.
• We shall use the term “j -measurable” to mean measurable at step number j , that
is, at time s(n)j , and write Pj = P(n)j for the probability measure conditional on
the filtration generated up to this time/step and Ej = E(n)j for the corresponding
conditional expectation.
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• The {ξ (n)i }i,n will be mutually independent and each ξ (n)i bounded, and
there exists some (common) constant ν > 0 such that ess inf ξ (n)i < −ν and
ess sup ξ (n)i > ν.• Since ξj is independent of the past, we shall suppress the dependence of law in
terms like e.g., ess supξj which will denote the supremum over the (Pj -)essential
support of ξj .
• Two pieces of notation: K ′1 shall denote the partial derivative with respect to the
first variable. The symbol  shall mean “no smaller than and not a.s. equal.”
• a is assumed locally bounded, and G is assumed continuous and strictly increas-
ing.
It should be remarked that it is unreasonable for an approximation to normalised
standard Brownian motion that ν < 1, but only in parts of Theorems 3.7 and 3.8
shall we actually need that 0 is interior in the support. Bounded support will how-
ever be essential for the arbitrage conditions, and the following result will be sim-
plified by assuming a common bound:
Theorem 2.2 (Weak convergence). Suppose E[ξi] = 0, E[ξ2i ] = 1 and
ess sup |ξi | ≤ M < ∞ (all i, n). Then Z(n) converges weakly to Z, and for con-
tinuous G also S(n) to S, on the Skorohod space D([t0, T ]), every T > t0.
Proof. The drift and the already occurred part will represent no issue, and we can
take A = A(n) = J = 0 without loss of generality. Also, we can take G to be the
identity, as weak limits commute with continuous functions G. Now convergence
in finite-dimensional distributions follows like in Sottinen (2001, Theorem 1): by
the CLT, the limit is Gaussian with zero mean; for the covariances, the indepen-
dence of the ξi ’s yields, for T ≥ t ≥ t0
E
[
Z(n)(T )Z(n)(t)
]= nt−1∑
i=nt0
K
(nT 
n
, s
(n)
i
)
K
(nt
n
, s
(n)
i
)
· E
[(
ξ
(n)
i+1√
n
)2]
(2.7)
which is a Riemann sum converging to the desired value
∫ t
t0 K(T , s)K(t, s)ds.
It remains to prove tightness, which will follow by a set of sufficient conditions
given in Whitt (2007, Lemma 3.11(ii.b)). For T ≥ t + h ≥ t ≥ t0, we have
Ej
[(
Z(n)(t + h) − Z(n)(t))2]
=
n(t+h)−1∑
i=nt0
(
K
(n(t + h)
n
, s
(n)
i
)
− K
(nt
n
, s
(n)
i
))2
Ej
[(
ξ
(n)
i+1√
n
)2]
≤ M
2
n
sup
t∈(t0,T−h)
n(t+h)−1∑
i=nt0
(
K
(n(t + h)
n
, s
(n)
i
)
− K
(nt
n
, s
(n)
i
))2
.
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For each n, let tn be an argsup. For any subsequence of tn converging to a limit
point t¯ , we have convergence as a Riemann sum:
→ M2
∫ t¯+h
t0
(
K(t¯ + h, s)− K(t¯, s))2 ds (2.8)
which by square integrability tends to 0 as h does. 
For the discrete-time markets, we shall restrict ourselves to the following set of
strategies:
Definition 2.3. Let n < ∞ be given. For any natural q , a “q-period strategy”
(“single period strategy” if q = 1), consists of waiting until some stopping time
t∗ = s(n)j∗ ≥ s(n)j0 , buying a j∗-measurable number u > 0 of units, holding these un-
til a stopping time t∗ = s(n)j∗ where j∗ ∈ {j∗ + 1, . . . , j∗ + q} and then selling all u
units.
The “net return” from this transaction is
R = Rj∗,j∗ := u ·
(
S(n)
(
t∗
)− S(n)(t∗))− (∗ + ∗) · λ, (2.9)
where λ∗ and λ∗ are the respective transaction costs for buying and selling,
allowed to depend on prices and units like in Assumption 2.4 below.
The reason for the “λ” parameter is that we will consider the properties for small
transaction costs, and it will be convenient to scale by a number. The main results
will be carried out under for fixed transaction costs and u = 1, and Proposition 3.2
will show that this is sufficiently general. For the time being, assume the more
parsimonious form for ∗, ∗:
Assumption 2.4. ∗ = ∗(u, S(n)(t∗)) and ∗ = ∗(u, S(n)(t∗), S(n)(t∗)) will
be nonnegative functions, bounded in (S(n)(t∗), S(n)(t∗)), while λ will be a number
≥ 0.
Definition 2.5. We shall use the term “transaction cost λ” to imply that u = 1 and
∗ + ∗ = 1 (identically), and we shall refer to “the simple model (2.10)” the
single period case of transaction cost λ where G is the identity.
This “simple model” will be the main focus. For this case, the net return on the
event {j∗ < ∞} will be
S(n)
(
t0 + j∗ + 1 − nt0
n
)
− S(n)
(
t0 + j∗ − nt0
n
)
− λ
(2.10a)
= x(n)j∗ + y(n)j∗ + z(n)j∗+1 − λ,
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where we introduce the notation
xj = x(n)j =
1
n
{
a
(
s
(n)
j
)+ J (s(n)j+1)− J (s(n)j )}, (2.10b)
yj = y(n)j =
1√
n
j−1∑
i=j0
[
K
(
s
(n)
j+1, s
(n)
i
)− K(s(n)j , s(n)i )]ξ (n)i+1, (2.10c)
zj+1 = z(n)j+1 =
1√
n
K
(
s
(n)
j+1, s
(n)
j
)
ξ
(n)
j+1 (2.10d)
adopting the convention that the empty sum, corresponding to j = j0 (= nt0), is
zero. Notice that the z(n)j+1 term will represent the innovation from step j to j + 1,
and has subscript “j + 1” since it is only j + 1-measurable. The xj and yj , which
correspond to the memory of the process as well as the drift a, are j -measurable.
An arbitrage will occur in the market if the memory contribution dominates even
in the worst-case innovation. The next section will make this more precise.
3 Free lunches: Sufficient conditions
Starting out with the definitions from the previous section, we now define arbi-
trage and free lunches with vanishing risk under our admissibility conditions. In-
formally, we have a FLVR if we can obtain an arbitrarily small downside to mean
return ratio, and an arbitrage if one can have positive-mean return without down-
side. The arguably most natural, and also the strictest, concept of “downside” is
the worst-case outcome, the essential supremum of the negative part, and we shall
restrict ourselves to such a definition. The following definition appears notation-
ally a bit cryptic, but will under q-period strategies coincide with the conventional
definition of FLVR and arbitrage; informally, it says that downside should be arbi-
trarily small compared to expected return (and we note that the expectation term is
finite, by boundedness of the ξi ). Note however that this diverges on the outset—
though not in substance, as we shall see below—from a commonplace assumption
of fixed horizon. This fixed horizon is less natural here, where the strategies in-
volve waiting first and only then is there a bound on the holding period.
Definition 3.1. Fix n,q both < ∞. Consider the condition
ess inf(Pj∗ )[Rj∗,j∗ |Dj∗]
E[Rj∗,j∗ |Dj ]
> −δ and E[Rj∗,j∗ |Dj∗] ∈ (0,∞). (3.1)
• The market is said to admit free lunch with vanishing risk (“FLVR”) in q periods
if for every δ > 0 there exist stopping times j∗≥ j0 and j∗ ∈ {j∗ +1, . . . , j∗ +q}
and a j∗-measurable event Dj∗ with Pj0[Dj∗] > 0, such that (3.1) holds.• The FLVR is called an arbitrage if the FLVR definition holds also for δ = 0.
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• The simple model (2.10) will be said to admit FLVR, respectively, arbitrage, if
the respective definition applies with q = 1 (i.e., j∗ = j∗ + 1).
Whenever necessary to distinguish the ex ante (at j0) random variable which is ei-
ther 0 (if Dj does not occur) or > 0 on one hand, from the Dj -conditional positive
return on the other—colloquially speaking, the lottery ticket that yields  0 from
the actual positive lunch prize—we shall use terms like the “event” that the lunch
“manifests itself.”
Obviously, the lack of time bound makes no difference for an arbitrage; if there
is an arbitrage according to this definition, then for some fixed Q, there is an ar-
bitrage which is closed out within Q steps, that is, j∗ ≤ Q. Conversely, it does
not matter that q is assumed deterministic; had we employed the same definition
except with q being merely measurable and finite, we would have had an arbitrage
for some deterministic q as well. The FLVR definition, on the other hand, might
require an unbounded j∗. Informally, a FLVR is a sequence of lunches with uni-
formly positive mean, but where the risk tends to zero. This means that for any
nonzero downside you choose as tolerance, then there is a fixed Q such that you
have a lunch within your risk tolerance within Q steps. Letting downside tend to
zero, then our setup allows Q to grow, as long as q obeys a fixed bound; com-
pare this to the usual Black–Scholes setup, which rules out the strategy of trading
and waiting for the unbounded stopping time until your position has made a given
profit.
For the purpose of giving sufficient conditions for arbitrage/FLVR under small
transaction cost—which is the main object of this section—the simple model
(2.10), for which q = 1, turns out fairly close to general.
Proposition 3.2 (Free lunches in the simple model (2.10) vs. in the full model).
Fix u > 0, n < ∞. Assume that ∗ of at most linear growth w.r.t. the last variable
(the selling price). Then there is an arbitrage for sufficiently small λ, provided that
so is the case in the simple model (2.10). If G is convex, then there is FLVR for
sufficiently small λ, provided that so is the case in the simple model (2.10).
Proof. The proof is less interesting, and is relegated to the Appendix. Notice that
if ξjK(s(n)j+1, s
(n)
j ) is upper bounded (for every j and n), then the at most linear
growth condition will hold (since an arbitrage must be closed out in a bounded
number of periods). 
Informally, an arbitrage in the simple model (2.10), occurs if at some bounded
j∗ ∈ [j0,∞), given the information available then, the transaction costs plus
the worst-case possible downside from the innovation z(n)j∗+1 will be more than
fully compensated by the contribution from the dependence of the past (i.e.,
x
(n)
j∗+1 + y(n)j∗+1); a FLVR occurs if it is “sufficiently more than compensated in
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mean” and “nearly fully compensated in worst-case.” The following result is key
for the arbitrage case.
Proposition 3.3 (Sufficient conditions for arbitrage in the simple model (2.10)).
Fix n < ∞. If for some natural j ≥ j0, we have
ess sup
{ξi}i=j0+1,...,j
{xj + yj } + ess inf
ξj+1
zj+1 ≥ λ¯ ≥ 0 (3.2)
we have an arbitrage for all transaction costs λ ∈ [0, λ¯) by choosing j∗ = this j .
Furthermore, we have arbitrage for transaction cost λ¯ if in addition there is a point
probability that zj+1 attains its ess sup.
Proof. Suppose (3.2) holds for some λ¯. Let Dj be the j -measurable event of at-
taining
xj + yj ≥ ess sup
{ξi}i=j0+1,...,j
{xj + yj } − ε.
Then Pj0[Dj ] > 0 for each ε > 0; let ε ∈ (0, λ¯ − λ) if nonempty. Should the event
Dj occur at step j , then (2.10a) is > 0 and so is the ess inf of (3.1), where then
both numerator and denominator become positive. Arbitrage also for transaction
cost λ¯ holds if we have positive probability at ε = 0. 
So the discrete market will admit an arbitrage if there may occur a period so
good that the contribution from this beneficial history, knocks out the innovation
so much that the worst-case scenario is a profit. Evidently, this will not happen if
K is a constant (i.e., ordinary Brownian motion), for then the history does not mat-
ter; on the other hand, if K is increasing in its first variable, then it is near-trivial
to construct arbitrage examples by letting downside be bounded and the upside
be unbounded. While one can certainly imagine a some modeler trying to use,
for example, a shifted lognormal in order to model limited liability investments,
a choice of a symmetric distribution for the ξi would arguably be more natural
and innocuous-looking. But for a suitably wide range of models, a larger down-
side than upside will not even prevent an arbitrage, as we shall soon see. For the
book-keeping of “good” and “bad” ξi outcomes, we shall denote their essential
suprema/infima as follows:
Mi = M(n)i = ess sup ξ (n)i , (3.3a)
mi = m(n)i = − ess inf ξ (n)i . (3.3b)
Standing at step j , then the worst that can happen in the next innovation, cf.
(2.10c), is denoted βj (“beta” for “bad”):
βj = β(n)j =
{
−mj if K(s(n)j+1, s(n)j )≥ 0,
Mj otherwise.
(3.4a)
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Looking back in time, we define γij (“gamma” for “good” ) to be the best possible
history over i = j0, . . . , j (cf. (2.10b)):
γij = γ (n)ij =
{
Mi if K
(
s
(n)
j+1, s
(n)
i
)≥ K(s(n)j , s(n)i ),−mi otherwise. (3.4b)
We want to specify this in terms of time, not only steps. Suppose we are targeting
an arbitrage within time T for the discretised model, choosing j∗ to be the second-
to-last step before time T , closing out the transaction before time T :
j∗ + 1 = ⌊nT − nt0 + nt0⌋. (3.5)
Then define (T , s) = (n)(T , s) as a left-continuous step function with values
(T , s
(n)
i ) = γij∗ ; extend it to be 0 for s ∈ [s(n)j∗ , T ]. Consider then n−1/2yj∗ and
bear in mind that j∗ depends on n chosen as (3.5). Then, provided that limits exist
(again, K ′1 denotes the derivative w.r.t. the first variable), we have
lim
n
(ess supyj∗
√
n) ≥
∫ T
t0
K ′1(T , s) lim infn 
(n)(T , s)ds,
where the inequality follows from nonnegativity of the integrand and the Fatou
lemma. So, given ε > 0, then for all large enough but finite n, there will be positive
Pj0 measure of the event
Dj∗ =
{
yj∗ ≥
[∫ T
t0
K ′1(T , s)(n)(T , s)ds − ε
]
n−1/2
}
. (3.6)
This gives rise to the following result.
Theorem 3.4 (Sufficient conditions for arbitrage within time T in the simple
model (2.10)). Fix a T > t0 and for each n, let j∗ be given by (3.5). Assume that
at T we have J Hölder continuous with exponent α > 1/2, and furthermore that
K(t, s) is differentiable in the first variable, at t = T , for each s ∈ (t0, T ). Then if∫ T
t0
K ′1(T , s)(n)(T , s)ds >
∣∣K(s(n)j∗+1, s(n)j∗ )β(n)j ∣∣+ ε¯ (3.7)
holds for all large enough n, some ε¯ > 0, then for any n large enough, there is an
arbitrage with sufficiently small transaction costs, by waiting until step j∗.
Proof. Under the assumptions, we would on the event in (3.6) have a net return of
at least
[a(s(n)j∗ ) + J (s(n)j∗+1) − J (s(n)j∗ )
n1/2
+
∫ T
t0
K ′1(T , s)(n)(T , s)ds
− ∣∣K(s(n)j∗+1, s(n)j∗ )β(n)j ∣∣− ε
]
n−1/2 − λ
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and the Hölder regularity ensures that the first term inside the bracket (i.e., xj
√
n),
will vanish as n grows. Then by (3.7), the net return will for large enough n be a
positive random variable, even with small transaction costs. 
Remark 3.5. First, observe that if lims↗T K(T , s) = 0, then this would lead to
arbitrages. Second, note that Theorem 3.4 is stated for fixed T , but it is sufficient
to look for some T where it applies. For example, if ξi have symmetric support for
each n, then we can replace (3.7) by
sup
{∫ T
t0
∣∣K ′1(T , s)∣∣ds −
∣∣∣∣K
(
T ,T − 1
n
)∣∣∣∣
}
> 0, (3.8)
where the sup is taken over those T > t0 for which n(T − t0) is integer. Now one
can look for arbitrages by letting T grow.
Theorem 3.4 also applies to semimartingales. The corollary is stated only for
the natural choice of symmetric innovations.
Corollary 3.6. There are infinite-variation semimartingales Z, equalling weak
limits of their discretisations Z(n) formed by i.i.d. bounded symmetric ξi , for which
Theorem 3.4 applies.
Proof. Put t0 = 0 for simplicity. From Cheridito (2004, Theorem 3.9), it is suf-
ficient for the semimartingale property that K(t, s) = κ(t − s) on t > s > 0 with
κ being continuous and piecewise differentiable with κ ′ ∈ L2((0,∞)), and under
these conditions, total variation is infinite on compacts iff κ(0+) = 0. Choose a
κ ≥ 0 with a global maximum at T , with κ(T ) > 2κ(0+) > 0; then it satisfies the
hypothesis of Theorem 3.4, and we only need κ(ϑ) to be smooth and κ ′ to tend
sufficiently fast to 0 as to be square integrable. 
The form where the dependence on (t, s) only appear through the difference,
will cover many cases and simplify calculations. We introduce the conditions:
For each n, we have i-independent mi = m = m(n)
and Mi = M = M(n), (3.9a)
K(t, s) = κ((t − s)+) for s ≥ t0, with κ not constant on (0,∞) (3.9b)
—the nonconstantness ruling out the ordinary Brownian motion. As seen above,
this form covers a wide class of even semimartingales. We can then write y and z
as
yj = 1√
n
j−1∑
i=j0
[
κ
(
j + 1 − i
n
)
− κ
(
j − i
n
)]
ξ
(n)
i+1, (3.10a)
zj+1 = 1√
n
κ
(1
n
)
ξ
(n)
j+1. (3.10b)
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Now consider the good outcomes γij ; if κ is monotone or m = M , then the se-
ries in (3.10a) will telescope. A nonmonotone κ only has more variation, which
increases the sum, so the ess sup of yj will therefore be at least∣∣∣∣
(
κ
(
j − j0 + 1
n
)
− κ
(1
n
))/√
n
∣∣∣∣
(3.11)
·
⎧⎨
⎩M
(n) if κ
(
j − j0 + 1
n
)
≥ κ
(1
n
)
,
m(n) otherwise
(if we want to utilise the variation of κ , we could write in terms as a sum of
|κ ′|-terms, tending to the constant times the total variation of κ over the interval
(1/n, (j − j0 + 1)/n)). We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7 (Sufficient conditions for arbitrage in the simple model under
the form (3.9)). Suppose that J is Hölder continuous with index α > 1/2 and fur-
thermore that for some subsequence n, we have m(n), and M(n) bounded. Then,
each of the following conditions implies arbitrage for all large enough —and
furthermore, for each of those n, the arbitrage admits small enough transaction
costs:
(a) lim inf |κ(1/n)| = 0, or κ changes sign.
(b) The total variation of κ over (0,∞) (i.e., ∫∞0 |κ ′(ϑ)|dϑ if κ ′ exists), is > than
lim inf

[∣∣κ(1/n)∣∣ · max{M(n),m(n)}
min{M(n),m(n)}
]
.
Proof. In all cases, Hölder regularity ensures that xj
√
n will tend to 0 as n grows.
Then:
(a) By (3.9b), κ takes some nonzero value. Suppose first that κ(1/n) ↘ 0 while
κ(ϑ) > 0. Then choosing a sequence of j ’s so that (j − j0 + 1)/n approxi-
mates ϑ from the appropriate side (recall that (2.2a) assumes only piecewise
continuity), we obtain
√
n · [zj+1 + ess supyj+1] ≥ M ·
[
κ
(
j − j0 + 1
n
)
− κ
(1
n
)
− m
M
κ
(1
n
)]
→ Mκ(ϑ) > 0.
The negative-sign case likewise converges to m · |κ(ϑ)|. Now suppose that
κ changes sign, and by the previous part of the proof, we can assume that
κ(1/n) is bounded away from 0. Suppose that κ(1/n) > 0 > κ(ϑ). Then
choosing j as above, we obtain
√
n · [zj+1 + ess supyj+1] ≥ m ·
[
κ
(1
n
)
− κ
(
j − j0 + 1
n
)
− κ
(1
n
)]
= −mκ
(
j − j0 + 1
n
)
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which is positive whenever n is large enough. The case with reversed signs
follows likewise.
(b) √n ess supyj exceeds min{m(n),M(n)} × total variation on ( 1n, j−j0+1n ), while
even in the worst case,
√
nzj ≥ −|κ(1/n)| · max{m(n),M(n)}. 
The Hölder regularity condition on J in Theorems 3.4 and 3.7 admits ramifica-
tions, as we need only bound the downside—it can be replaced by the condition
that for each n we have xj ≥ 0 for infinitely many j , which by symmetry of W oc-
curs in at least half of the cases (unconditionally, i.e., “P−∞”). Should xj
√
n blow
up as n grows, then it would be expected that J (T ,T − 1/n) oscillates around
0, and we would be able to extract a subsequence where it adds positively to the
return. Similar considerations would improve upon the next Theorem 3.8 as well.
Before we state that result, it should be noted that the total variation criterion can
also be improved upon in the setup of Theorem 3.4, if the variation of the step func-
tion corresponding to grid size 1/n, diverges as time grows. When |κ(1/n)| → ∞,
and κ is monotone (anything else improves total variation) and does not change
sign (if it does, Theorem 3.4 part (a) applies), we can still have free lunches with
vanishing risk.
Theorem 3.8 (Sufficient conditions for FLVR under the form (3.9)). Sup-
pose zero transaction cost and that M(n) = m(n) and infi E[ξ (n)i ]/m(n) > −1.
Furthermore, assume that κ does not change sign, and that infϑ |κ(ϑ)| = 0 <
lim infn |κ(1/n)| (possibly = +∞). Then either of the following is sufficient for
FLVR:
(a) For given n: x(n)j ≥ 0 for infinitely many j , and additionally, limϑ→∞ κ(ϑ) =
0.
(b) J is Hölder continuous with index > 1/2, lim infn infi E[ξ
(n)
i ]
m(n)
> −1, and n is
large enough. The FLVR is an arbitrage if the positivity of the xj is uniform
(w.r.t. j ).
Proof. We prove only the case of positive κ . Just like in the proof of Theorem 3.7
part (a), √n(ess supyj + ess inf zj+1) will telescope to −m(n)κ(j−j0+1n ), which
can be made arbitrarily close to 0; a Pj0 -positive event will be it falling within ε/n
of −m(n)κ(j−j0+1
n
). It will turn out that this takes care of the numerator of (3.1) in
the FLVR definition. For the denominator, we need the expected return:
xj + ess supyj + E[zj+1]
= xj + 1√
n
[
−mκ
(
j − j0 + 1
n
)
+ mκ
(1
n
)
+ κ
(1
n
)
Eξj+1
]
(3.12)
= xj + m√
n
[
−κ
(
j − j0 + 1
n
)
+ κ
(1
n
)(
1 + Eξj+1
m
)]
.
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(a) Now passing through a subsequence with nonnegative xj , then κ(j−j0+1n ) will
vanish and (3.12) will be positive from the assumption; this takes care of the
denominator of (3.1). Assuming that the numerator is negative (otherwise there
is arbitrage), the ratio (3.1) will on the Pj0 -positive event of the history falling
within ε/
√
n of its ess sup, exceed(
−mκ
(
j − j0 + 1
n
)
− ε
)/(
m
[
−κ
(
j − j0 + 1
n
)
+ κ
(1
n
)(
1 + Eξj+1
m
)])
which tends to 0 as j and ε−1 grow.
(b) The ratio (3.1) becomes—with ε = εn possibly n-dependent—(
m√
n
[
xj
√
n
m
− κ
(
j − j0 + 1
n
)
− ε
m
√
n
])
/( m√
n
[
xj
√
n
m
− κ
(
j − j0 + 1
n
)
− ε
m
√
n
+ κ
(1
n
)(
1 + Eξj+1
m
)])
.
First, cancel m/
√
n. Then, observe that as in the proof of Theorem 3.7 part (a),
we can choose j depending on n as to approximate the appropriate ϑ , or
possibly the appropriate sequence of ϑ’s, so that κ(j−j0+1
n
) vanishes in the
limit, along with—by assumption—everything involving xj . Then for suitably
small ε, then κ(1/n) will make the denominator (and hence the expectation)
positive, while the numerator can be chosen arbitrarily small. 
Remark 3.9. Notice that the statements of Theorem 3.7 and of Theorem 3.8
part (b), do not depend on what t0 is, and what history the agent faces upon entry.
It is certainly not obvious that it should be this way. The setup of Theorem 3.4 does
not rule out a priori that there could be an arbitrage initially, to be exploited at a
later stage if a positive event Dj occurs, but which with positive probability dis-
appears for good. (In more formal terms, the ξj+1 could be drawn so that not only
would Pj0+1[Dj ] = 0, but also Pj0+1[Pi[Dj ] > 0] = 0 for all i > j0.) But under
the applicability of Theorem 3.7 or Theorem 3.8 part (b), this will not be the case:
the arbitrage, respectively, FLVR, will show up for large enough n regardless of
whether the agent enters after a long “bad” period which hampers future prospects;
for fine enough discretisation, there will always be a positive event where the ar-
bitrage could materialise. This is not to say that the probability of this event is
independent of history, nor that the choice of positive event is—only the binary
question of existence. Under these results, regardless how disadvantageous the de-
velopment has been, the strategy of calmly waiting for lunch time, will always
yield positive expected value.
4 Some examples and nonexamples
We will in the following discuss a few cases. Throughout this section, assume
common symmetric support [−m,m].
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(a) Brownian motion is not prone to arbitrages in the discretised version; we have
K(t, s) = 1t>s>0, so there is no contribution from history.
(b) The Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process (mean-reverting to 0) admits the representa-
tion κ(ϑ) = κ(0) · e−vt with v > 0. This κ satisfies Theorem 3.8, which will
yield FLVR (but, easily, not arbitrage) if choosing the distribution of the ξi
to comply with the assumptions. If there is positive drift (mean-reversion to
a positive level μ), then the discretised version admits arbitrage. It should be
noted though, that in the continuous-time model, a portfolio of η(t) yields
a wealth process dynamics of η(t)dZ(t) = η(t)[v · (μ − Z(t)) + σ dW(t)],
where there is an arbitrarily big upside for given volatility level, by waiting
for Z to become negatively large. However, the continuous model remains
arbitrage-free, regardless of μ.
(c) Sottinen (2001) considers fractional Brownian motion with Hurst parameter
H > 1/2, using the representation
K(t, s) =
∫ t
s
(u/s)H−1/2(u − s)H−3/2 du
(up to an irrelevant positive constant), so that K(t+, t) = 0 and K ′1 is pos-
itive. Then by Remark 3.5 we will have Theorem 3.4 applying, as J (t) =∫ t0
0
∫ t
s (u/s)
H−1/2(u − s)H−3/2 dudW(s) is differentiable at t = T − (just in-
terchange order of integration).
Furthermore, by Remark 3.9, the arbitrage holds regardless of history. No
matter how bad (and how long!) the initial period until entry is, there is still a
positive event that a free lunch will actually manifest.
(d) Maybe a more common representation for fractional Brownian motion is, for
any H = 1/2 and up to a constant,
K(t, s) = (t − s)H−1/2 − ((−s)+)H−1/2,
corresponding to κ(ϑ) = ϑH−1/2. Let us assume that the ξi have the same
support. κ is monotonous, so then conditions (3.9) hold. Now the results are
different for positively (H > 1/2) and negatively (H < 1/2) autocorrelated
fBm:
• In the case H > 1/2, κ(0+) = 0 and κ is increasing. Furthermore, J is
Hölder continuous of order up to H . Theorem 3.4 applies, by Remark 3.5.
• In the case H < 1/2, κ(0+) = ∞ while κ(∞) = 0. Then for at least half of
the cases, Theorem 3.8 part (a) applies.
(e) Rogers (1997) proposes a modification of fractional Brownian motion, in order
to eliminate the arbitrage but preserve the long run memory properties which
motivated the use of fBm in finance in the first place. Rogers gives a specific
(monotone) example
κ(ϑ) = k · (ϑ2 + v)(H−1/2)/2, (4.1)
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but suggests more generally to choose κ such that κ(0) = 1, κ ′(0) = 1, and
has the same ∼ ϑH−1/2 behaviour for large ϑ . This behaviour, tending to ∞
for H > 1/2 and 0 for H < 1/2, is sufficient to yield the same results as for
example (d).
(f) For a mix between a fractional and an (uncorrelated) ordinary Brownian mo-
tion, there is a very peculiar result by Cheridito (2001): if the fBm part has
H > 3/4, then it behaves just as drift (which, e.g., means that it does not enter
in the Black–Scholes formula). For H ≤ 3/4, there is still arbitrage as if there
were no Brownian component. However, in our case, such a process works
like example (e) when H > 1/2: mixing in Brownian motion at volatility σ ,
we get κ(t − s) replaced by √σ 2 + κ(t − s)2 = (σ 2 + (t − s)2H−1)1/2 which
for H > 1/2 works analogous to (4.1), and will admit arbitrage in the dis-
cretisation. There is apparently nothing happening at the Cheridito threshold
of 3/4.
We end this section by pointing out that not only are the discrete markets possi-
bly different than their weak limits when it comes to existence of free lunches; the
arbitrages themselves might occur from different properties of K . In the canonical
models, either of the properties κ(0+) = 0 and κ(+∞) = +∞ will lead to arbi-
trages, and the latter will be due to the long-run memory. The long-run memory
was arguably the reason why fractional Brownian motion κ(ϑ) = ϑH−1/2 (with
H > 1/2) was suggested in the first place as driving noise for financial mar-
kets, and the Rogers proposal of example (e) above, leaves that long memory
in the process. Let assume that t0 = 0, and that, coincidentally, xj0 = xj0+1 = 0
in order to isolate short-term effects. Fix n for the moment. Then the first-step
innovation is symmetric, and the next one cannot lead to arbitrage either, as
κ(2/n)− κ(1/n) < κ(1/n) by concavity. The minimum number of steps (after j0)
for the arbitrage for the fBm case, is the smallest integer > 21/(H−1/2) (equality
suffices if the ess sup has point mass), so that the absolute minimum is 5 steps,
obtained for H above ≈ 0.931. Of course, as the partition refines and n grows, this
happens in shorter time, thus approaching the continuous-time setup where the
profit instantly increases from 0 (Framstad (2004)). On the other hand, even when
mixed with ordinary Brownian motion, the Examples (e) and (f) yield arbitrages;
boosting up the ordinary Brownian part, will merely require a longer beneficial
period before the arbitrage manifests itself. Those arbitrages are due to the long
run behaviour—namely, the fact that κ tends to +∞ on the long run.
5 Concluding remarks
We have seen that discrete-time random walk markets may behave radically dif-
ferent from their weak limits, as the former may admit arbitrages or FLVRs which
vanish in the limit. Furthermore, quite a few of our estimates may be sharpened
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and the results likely ramified. That is in the author’s opinion not a main concern.
Rather, it has turned out that a type of result once interpreted as another objectional
property of the fBm’s, is simply to be expected if one models moving average pro-
cesses in such a careless way.
One could certainly try to remedy the problem by choosing wide supports with
low probability of the arbitrages manifesting themselves. Arguably, a practitioner
should be worried even at far less radical modeling issues than the binary existence
of arbitrage, and a quick fix which merely covers up the most obvious undesirable
property, might not be an adequate solution to the inherent problem.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.2
Put u = q = 1. Denote the buying and selling prices in the simple model (2.10)
by ζ∗ and ζ ∗, and in the full model by S∗ = G(ζ∗) and S∗ = G(ζ ∗). Observe
first that we may take ζ∗ bounded by restricting Dj without avoiding the property
Pj0[Dj ] > 0, and we will do so in the following. Assume that the simple model
(2.10) has arbitrage for transaction cost c > 0; then
ζ ∗  ζ∗ + c
which by applying G and rearranging, is equivalent to
S∗ − S∗ − λ(∗(1, S∗, S∗)+ ∗(1, S∗))
G(ζ∗ + c) − G(ζ∗) − λ(∗(1,G(ζ∗),G(ζ ∗))+ ∗(1,G(ζ∗)))
so we have arbitrage if the right-hand side is nonnegative, so it suffices that
0 < λ ≤ G(ζ∗ + c) − G(ζ∗)
∗(1,G(ζ∗),G(ζ ∗)) + ∗(1,G(ζ∗)) . (A.1)
As already remarked, we can assume ζ∗ bounded, so it suffices to bound ∗ for
given ζ∗. By at most linear growth, ∗(1, S∗, S∗) ≤ λ0(S∗) + λ1(S∗) · S∗, where
λ0, λ1 are locally bounded functions of S∗, the return is
Y = S∗ − S∗ − λ(∗(1, S∗, S∗)+ ∗(1, S∗))
≥ S∗(1 − λλ1(S∗))− S∗(1 − λλ1(S∗))− λλ1(S∗)S∗ − λ(∗ + λ0).
By boundedness of S∗ we can take λλ1(S∗) < 1, in which case the return will be
 0 if
S∗ − S∗  λλ0 + λ1S∗ + ∗1 − λλ1(S∗)
which at least equals λ · 2(λ0 + λ1S∗ + ∗) =: λ˜, where ˜ is a locally bounded
function of S∗ alone. Hence, we can consider the problem with ˜ in place of ∗
and assuming ∗ = 0, and then the right-hand side of (A.1) will not depend on the
selling price ζ ∗. We are done with the arbitrage part of the proposition.
For FLVR, it suffices to point out that Jensen’s inequality improves both the
upside and downside for convex G, compared to for linear ones.
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